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Abstract
Incentives are regarded as motivational tools which can be used to propel 
construction workforces to achieve project objectives. This article contributes to 
the existing body of knowledge by evaluating the current practices of incentive 
mechanisms in the South African construction industry and identifying the 
challenges confronting the use of incentives. The study adopts both qualitative 
and quantitative methods for data collection. For the quantitative approach, a 
total number of 52 project stakeholders practising in Gauteng participated in the 
survey by completing the structured questionnaire. The questionnaire survey is 
used to obtain information from respondents, in order to assess their perceptions 
on the impact of current practices of incentives on work productivity and the 
construction industry. For the qualitative approach, personal interviews were 
conducted with selected respondents to clarify their answers.
The findings reveal ‘unattainable project goals’, ‘poor communication 
processes’, and ‘inappropriate contractual arrangement’ as the most significant 
challenges confronting the use of incentives in the South African construction 
industry. The findings reported in this article show problems frustrating the 
absolute absorption of incentives in the industry, and also contribute to 
redesigning the incentive plan so as to improve project performance.
Keywords: incentives, alliance, contract strategy, best performance, and 
construction industry.
Abstrak
Aansporingsmaatreëls word as motiveringswerktuig beskou wat gebruik kan 
word om die werkerskorps aan te spoor om sodoende prestasiedoelwitte te 
bereik. Hierdie artikel dra by tot die kennisgebied deur huidige praktyke van 
aansporingsmeganismes in die Suid-Afrikaanse konstruksiebedryf te evalueer 
asook die uitdagings wat met die gebruik van aansporingsmaatreëls gepaard 
gaan. Die studie maak gebruik van beide kwalitatiewe en kwantitatiewe 
metodes vir data-insamelingdoeleindes. Vir die kwalitatiewe benadering het 
‘n totaal van 52 projekbelanghebbendes, wat in Gauteng praktiseer, aan 
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die opname deelgeneem deur die gestruktureerde vraelys te voltooi. Die 
vraelysopname is gebruik om inligting van respondente te bekom om sodoende 
hul waarneming oor die impak van huidige praktyke van aansporingsmaatreëls 
op produktiwiteit van arbeid en die konstruksiebedryf te toets. Vir die 
kwalitatiewe benadering is persoonlike onderhoude gevoer met sommige van 
die respondente om antwoorde te verklaar.
Die bevindinge toon “onbereikbare projekdoelwitte”, “swak kommunikasie-
prosesse” en “nie-toepaslike kontraktuele ooreenkomste” as die belangrikste 
uitdagings waarmee die aansporingskwessies in die Suid-Afrikaanse 
konstruksiebedryf te make het. Die bevindinge wat in hierdie artikel uitgelig 
word, dui op probleme wat ondervind word met die volkome aanvaarding en 
dwarsboming van aansporingsmaatreëls in die bedryf. Verder dra die artikel 
ook by tot ‘n nuwe benadering vir die herontwerp van die aansporingsplan om 
projekprestasie te verbeter.
Sleutelwoorde: aansporingsmaatreëls, alliansie, kontrakstrategie, bestewerk-
verrigting, konstruksiebedryf.
1. Introduction
Over the years, construction activity has recorded a significant 
increase in the complexity of contract service delivery and this 
resulted in the quest for a better contract strategy to promote best 
performance (Ogwueleka, 2010: 209). The general view and concern 
about achieving best performance is focused on developing capacity 
issues. Capacity development does not automatically translate into 
better performance; it requires some fundamental elements to propel 
it so as to achieve the desired outcomes (Boesen & Therkildsen, 
2004: online). The use of traditional construction contracts to meet 
clients’ expectations and contractors’ objectives has led to distrust 
and conflict between clients and contractors (Egan, 1998: 21). The 
demand to improve performance through cooperative strategies, 
thereby reducing confrontations and promoting equity in allocation 
of risks amongst the contracting parties, has led to the introduction of 
partnering in the early 1980s in Japan and in USA (Naoum, 2003: 72). 
Bygballe, Jahre & Swardt (2010: 239, citing CII, 1991) define partnering 
as a “long term commitment between two or more organisations 
for the purpose of achieving the specific business objectives by 
maximizing the effectiveness of each of the participants”. Partnering 
has to do with having a working relationship between stakeholders 
based on respect, trust, teamwork, commitment and shared goals 
(OGC, 2003: online). 
 Lu & Yan (2007: 243) establish the collaboration of partnering as good 
faith which cannot be sufficiently reinforced. Previous studies have 
emphasised that it is difficult to achieve and maintain collaboration 
between clients and contractors without a formal commitment 
(Bresnen, 2007: 367; Laan, Noorderhaven, Voorijk & Dewulf, 2011: 100). 
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Recent studies have advocated the process of drafting a formal 
contract to promote joint learning process, mutual understanding, 
and long-term and trusting exchange relationships (Popp & Zenger, 
2002: 799; Vlaar, Van den Bosh & Volberda, 2006: 1620). This has 
led to the incorporation of alliance contracting into partnering 
in order to overcome the weaknesses associated with the use of 
partnering. Alliance contracting is reinforced by incentive design, 
whereby the sharing of resources, risks and profits/losses is properly 
defined among contracting parties in a moral/contract agreement 
measured against performance indicators (Tang, Qiang, Duffield 
& Young, 2008: 460). Henneveld (2006: CD-ROM) defines alliances 
as “incentive-based contracts in which the parties agree to work 
together as an integrated team in a relationship that is based on the 
principles of equity, trust, respect, openness, no dispute and blame”. 
The recent use of alliance has also faced challenges relating to the 
design of appropriate risks and reward systems which can motivate 
project participants (Rose, 2008: 45).
Many researchers have advocated the use of incentives as 
motivational tools to reduce misalignment of objectives, fragmented 
association between contracting parties, and risk-averse behaviours 
(Martin, 2008: online; Drake, 2008: 398). In the South African 
construction industry, the stakeholders have continuously expressed 
concern regarding the use of incentives. Some have attributed the 
use of incentives to the ‘big guys’ in the construction industry, which 
has attracted sympathy among government and regulatory bodies. 
The quest to discard the use of incentives is on-going, and if successful, 
what will be the fate of best performance in the industry? This article 
aims to evaluate the current practices of incentive mechanisms in the 
South African construction industry and the challenges confronting 
the use of incentives.
2. Incentive mechanisms in construction projects
Broome & Perry (2002: 60) define an incentive as “an inducement to 
motivate an organisation or an individual in order to place greater 
emphasis on how to achieve an objective or to act in a certain way.” 
Incentive is the internal psychological process or internal power that 
is guided by the goal or object to stimulate and to maintain individual 
activities (Porter & Lawler, 1968: 25). This process includes three 
connotations: the first is to meet the individual’s target or outcome; 
the second is to determine the goal or outcome and how to achieve 
the mental processes and the third is the social process in which 
the individual’s behaviour is influenced by others. The concept of 
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incentive contracting is to give a contractor the opportunity to earn 
greater profits if s/he achieves the client’s expectations by taking 
full advantage of contractors’ objectives (Bower, Ashby, Gerald & 
Smyk, 2002: 37, citing Blyths, 1969). Incentive schemes consist of two 
attributes: to align the objectives of the contracting parties through 
the use of performance measures and to link them to payment 
(Richmond-Coggan, 2001: online).
The general view and concern about achieving best performance is 
focused on developing capacity issues. Capacity development does 
not automatically translate into better performance; it requires some 
fundamental elements to propel it in order to achieve the desired 
outcomes (Boesen & Therkildsen, 2004: online). Incentive systems and 
motivations are critical for capacity development, thereby propelling 
the individuals and organisations to perform their functions effectively, 
efficiently and sustainably (Boesen & Therkildsen, 2004: online). The 
general principles of incentive systems are to ensure that risks and 
rewards are commensurably and fairly distributed among the parties 
concerned, and that they are tailored to achieve specific project 
objectives (Bresnen & Marshall, 2000: 588). Incentive mechanism is still 
a developing field of knowledge and expertise in the construction 
industry; it has attracted many researchers from different countries. 
This reveals a wide recognition of incentive on project success. 
Empirical research on the motivation and performance in the context 
of construction projects is sparse (Ling, R’ahman & Ng, 2006: 58; 
Chapman & Ward, 2008: 660; Rose & Manley, 2011: 766).
The literature scan reveals that the majority of previous researchers 
focus on a single incentive plan (Berends, 2000: 168; Brenen & 
Marshall, 2000: 588). The single incentive plan does not reflect the 
weights of performance metrics, thus resulting in investing one’s effort 
in one area at the expense of other areas (Ittnera, Larcker & Meyer, 
2003: 728; Beer et al., 2004: 42). The common types of contractual 
incentives for construction projects are cost, schedule/delivery, 
technical/performance, and safety (Bower et al., 2002: 33; Bubshait, 
2003: 67; Lahdenpera & Koppinen, 2003: 483; Meng & Gallagher, 
2012: 354). Incentive schemes can be designed in three different 
forms, namely financial, semi-financial and non-financial schemes.
2.1 Financial incentive schemes
The offer of a financial reward to enhance the motivation of 
employees to work harder and smarter so as to attain project goals 
that is above minimum standards (Rose & Manley, 2005: 441). The use 
of financial incentives can improve the work quality and reducing 
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time and cost effectively (Ajayi, 2007: 61). These schemes are 
focused on inducing employees to achieve the stipulated project 
objectives in anticipation of monetary benefits, in some cases; 
they may be diametrically opposed to motivation (Whitmore, 2012: 
online).   Grant & Singh (2011: online) highlight three important risks 
that the excessive reliance on financial incentives may create as: 
a) they may enhance performance but do not guarantee that the 
performance improvement will come with ethical behaviour and 
actual improvements; b) they can demoralise employees who do 
not get them and actually reduce performance and fuel turnover; 
and c) they can generate a sort of addiction especially, where the 
employees are working for incentives. Examples of financial incentive 
schemes are premium bonus, profit sharing, measured day work, 
simple piece work, geared incentive schemes and group incentive 
schemes (Saka & Ajayi, 2010: 583).
2.2 Semi-financial incentive schemes
Semi-financial incentive schemes may be classified as those which 
have some monetary benefits, but which are not directly linked to 
output and wages. They are geared towards compensating for jobs 
that cannot be subjectively measured (Chavan, 2010: online). Saka & 
Ajayi (2010: 585) emphasise that the use of semi-financial incentive 
schemes produces the most satisfactory results when compared to 
other incentive schemes. The efficiency of these schemes relies on 
the company goals, existing employee attitudes, and managerial 
capabilities adopted during implementation (Saka & Ajayi, 2010: 585, 
citing Liska & Snell, 1993: 669). Examples of semi-financial incentive 
schemes are health schemes, saving schemes, housing, site welfare 
provision, and pension schemes (Saka & Ajayi, 2010: 585).
2.3 Non-financial incentive schemes
Non-financial incentive schemes are indirect rewards, which focus on 
providing psychological benefits for employees. These are centred 
on conveying appreciation to individual employees or teams in 
memorable ways, showing the task performed is inherently meaningful 
(Silverman, 2004:3). The schemes are embedded in theories of 
motivation, where the motivation to achieve quality of output is best 
achieved through satisfaction of higher needs (Maslow’s theory), 
awareness of the role of groups in the workplace (Mayo’s theory), 
and the need to provide motivators (Herzberg’s theory). Examples 
of non-financial incentive schemes are recognition, praise of good 
work, communication, empowerment, job autonomy, enlargement, 
and rotation (Armstrong, 2010: 161).
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The incentive system can be designed either through one or a 
combination of these schemes to achieve satisfaction among the 
individual, the group or the organisation in order to motivate them 
positively. Ncube, Bussin & De Swart (2013: 4-5) emphasise the 
importance of designing an incentive plan to incorporate both 
financial and non-financial metrics. Motivation of employees is 
a tricky trade which requires a clear understanding of concepts, 
principles and myths about motivation in order to effectively utilise it 
(Shanks & Dore, 2012: 43-51). Employees are different, act in different 
ways and are motivated by different things. Motivation is focused on 
redirecting the employee’s energies towards optimistically job-related 
behaviours (Manion, 2005: 44). This requires a good understanding of 
the employee’s strengths and weaknesses so as to establish what will 
be needed to get specific employees to perform and also on how 
to capitalise on the ways in which these employees learn in order to 
motivate them correctly (Brickingham, 2005: 76).
3. Current practices in the South African construction 
industry
Globally and in South Africa, the construction industry has the highest 
workforce and has remained a vital player in the economy. The 
South African construction industry is crucial as a whole because of 
its labour-intensive nature, and its role in supporting other economic 
sectors through the provision of buildings and construction (CETA, 
2008: online). The construction sector in South Africa is recognised 
as very large, diverse and complex in nature with vast numbers and 
ranges of employees (CETA, 2008: online). Yet the total number of 
liquidations decreased by 39.4% in March 2012 and the employment 
in construction also declined by 14.3% between 2008 and 2010; 6.7% 
in 2011, and 4.4% in 2012, with the current total population of 986 000 
employees (State of the Construction Industry, 2012: online). The 
contribution of the South African construction industry to GDP has also 
declined from 7% in 1970 to approximately 3% in 2000 (Dlungwana, 
Nxumalo, Huysteen, Rwelamila & Noyana, 2002: CD-ROM). In 2012, 
the contribution of the industry to GDP was regarded as insignificant 
with a relative of 3% of GDP (Statistics South Africa, 2012: online). 
Rust & Koen (2011: 2) emphasise that the slowdown in growth is a 
result of the lack of national planning coordination.
South Africa has a sophisticated construction sector with a large 
number of employers. However, approximately 95% of the firms 
can be characterised as small and micro-enterprises (CETA, 2008: 
online). It consists of a handful of large contractors of about five 
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leading construction firms, representing 75% of the total industry 
output (BMI, 2013: online). Table 1 shows the structure of contractors 
in South Africa. The main contractors engage in the business strategy 
of subcontracting with the view to avoiding uncertainties in the 
construction market (CIDB, 2013: online). Subcontracting has become 
predominant in the industry, with over 70% of the building projects and 
30% of the civil engineering works being subcontracted out (CIDB, 
2013: online). This allows the subcontractors to play a major role in 
infrastructure development. The contractual relationship between 
the main contractors and the subcontractors is on an ad hoc basis, 
where there is no formal contract; this restrains the advocacy for 
best performance through equity in allocation of risk. Hinze & Tracey 
(1994: 279) stipulate that subcontractors play a significant role in the 
project execution; there is a scarcity of publications about the actual 
process whereby they are initiated or how award arrangements 
are made. The key challenges faced by subcontractors are 
identified as lack of security payment, bid price pressure from main 
contractors, poor management, poor attitudes within subcontracting 
organisations, and general industry-wide factors including high level 
of competition, lack of working capital and skills shortages (CIDB, 
2013: online). The use of incentives was recommended as one of the 
measures to resolve these challenges (CIDB, 2013: online).
Table 1:  The structure of contractors in South Africa (Dlungwana 
et al., 2002: CD-ROM)
Category Economic sector Annual turnover Management skills level
Small Formal Less than R10M Very poor, fair
Informal
Medium Formal R10M – R50M Poor, fair, good and very good
Informal
Large Formal Above R50M Fair, good and very good
Previous documentation and interviews also reveal that the South 
African construction industry has adopted incentives. The incentive 
design is focused on disincentive/penalty, where the project duration 
is used for performance assessment. Figure 1 illustrates the structure 
of an incentive plan adopted by the Department of Public Works, 
South Africa.
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Commencement Targeted Completion Date
Actual 
Completion Date
Daily payment of 
preliminary and 
general fee by 
government
Daily penalty fee 
by contractors/ 
consultants
Figure 1:  An illustration of the incentive plan adopted by the Department of Public 
Works 
Source: Ogwueleka & Maritz, 2013: 90
The CIDB (2007: 2) reports that the construction sector has progressively 
declined since 1990, thus witnessing over 200 000 job losses in 2001. 
This challenge has been exacerbated in recent times by an increase 
in infrastructure investment. Business Monitor International (2013: 
online) reveals that the market infrastructure is still below average, 
with an acute shortage of skilled workforce across different sectors. 
CIBD (2007: 6) advocates that the remedy to shortage of skilled 
workers is not merely to equip new entrants with skills, but also to gain 
the appropriate workplace experience in order to consolidate their 
craftsmanship, as well as, supervisory and professional capabilities. 
There is a need to provide an environment for a bigger pool of skills 
in order to plug the gap of skill shortage (CIBD, 2007, citing Maleka, 
2006: 2). This requires a focus on improving the project environment 
by correctly motivating project participants.
4. Research methodology
The research problem addressed is that incentives have been 
advocated as tools to propel individuals and organisations to perform 
their tasks effectively, efficiently and sustainably. However, in South 
Africa’s construction industry, their functions have not been properly 
utilised. This article identifies the current practices and challenges 
associated with the use of incentives. The exploratory nature of this 
study requires a combination of both quantitative and qualitative 
methods of data collection. For a quantitative approach, surveys by 
means of questionnaires were found to be effective because of the 
relative ease of obtaining standard data appropriate for achieving 
the study’s objectives. A questionnaire survey was used to obtain 
information from respondents in order to assess their perceptions on 
the impact of current practices of incentives on work productivity and 
the construction industry. Amendments were made on the drafted 
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questionnaire based on the suggestions of the reviewers. According 
to Farrell (2011), the use of a qualitative method for data collection 
may be difficult to obtain an answer, but the data captured are rich. 
Personal interviews were conducted with some respondents in order 
to clarify their answers.
The study population consists of construction firms who are involved 
in both building and civil engineering works in the Gauteng province. 
Gauteng is the smallest of the nine provinces in South Africa, but has 
the highest population of about 12.3 million. It is regarded as the 
economic centre of South Africa, which accounts for over 34.8% of the 
country’s total GDP. The majority of the construction companies have 
their headquarters in the Gauteng province which has recorded the 
largest infrastructural development in South Africa. Kothari (2003: 32) 
stipulates that survey protocol of random sampling procedures 
allows a relatively small number of people to represent a much 
larger population. The study targeted project stakeholders including 
clients, designers, consultants, project managers, contractors and 
subcontractors. First, the questionnaire was distributed by means 
of open access, capturing project stakeholders in Gauteng and, 
second, the questionnaire was also distributed electronically to sixty-
five (65) project stakeholders. The majority of the respondents did not 
respond; therefore, face-to-face delivery was adopted to promote 
clarification of any arising queries and to raise the response rate. A total 
number of 65 questionnaires were administered to the construction 
professionals, but 13 opted out due to lack of awareness on the use 
of incentives; only 52 construction professionals participated in the 
research, with a response rate of 80%. The survey was carried out from 
March 2013 to June 2013.
5. Data analysis and interpretation
The questionnaire is categorised into three parts. Part one investigates 
the demographic information of respondents, while part two 
assesses the current practices of incentive mechanisms in the South 
African construction industry. Respondents are asked to evaluate 
the challenges confronting the effective use of incentive design 
in construction projects using a Likert-scale of 1=not significant, 
2=slightly significant, 3=moderately significant, 4=significant, 5=very 
significant in part three. The demographic information of respondents 
are analysed using the basic descriptive statistics, such as frequency 
counts, percentage and cumulative percentage. Data collected 
in part two was computed based on frequency distribution and are 
expressed as a percentage of the sample size using a line chart. In 
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part three, responses from the respondents are calculated using 
relative important index (RII) method to determine the effect of 
incentive design in the construction industry. Memon, Rahman & Azis 
(2012: 46) used RII to evaluate responses from respondents based on 
time and cost performance in construction projects (see equation 1). 
RII is calculated with the following expressions:
RII = ∑W/ AN                                                                    equation (1)
Where W represents weighting given to each factor by respondents 
and it ranges from 1 to 5 (for this study); A is the highest weight, which 
is 5 in this study; and N is the total number of respondents (52 for this 
study). The absolute deviation of the mean, variance, and standard 
deviation of the distribution are calculated to mean the scatter about 
the mean. The coefficient of skewness is computed to measure the 
distribution of the extreme value. SPSS is also used to determine the 
Cronbach’s alpha reliability test of their responses. 
6.  Findings and discussion
This section presents the analysis and discussion of the findings 
obtained from the copies of the administered questionnaire. Table 2 
reveals the demographic data of respondents. The analysis shows 
that respondents are involved at different levels in the industry. 
Their responses can thus be generalised for the construction sector. 
Table 2 also reveals that 46% of the respondents have more than 
ten years’ working experience in the construction industry; 21% have 
between eight to ten years; 18% have between five to seven years, 
and 15% have between two to four years’ experience. Therefore, 
their responses are of great value to this research. The contract 
procedure reveals that 73% of the respondents have been involved 
in both partnering and non-partnering projects. A total of 54% of the 
respondents are engaged in projects with average contract sums of 
between R20 million to R50 million.
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Table 2: The demographic data of respondents
Frequency Percentage Cumulative percentage










































































































6.1 Types of incentive scheme in projects
This section identifies the most frequently adopted incentive scheme 
in construction projects. Figure 2 reveals that 56% of the respondents 
have most frequently used cost/financial incentives in projects and 
that 39% have used schedule/delivery incentives in projects. Five per 
cent of the respondents agreed to have used multiple incentives, 
while none of the respondents ever used technical/performance 
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incentives. This reveals that cost/financial and schedule/delivery 
incentives are often adopted in the construction industry.
Figure 2:  Types of incentive scheme frequently adopted in projects
6.2 The design of incentives in the construction industry
This section seeks to establish how the incentives are designed in the 
construction industry. Figure 3 shows that 55% of the respondents were 
involved in projects, where the incentives are designed by client and 
consultant only, and that 45% of the respondents were involved in 
incentives through negotiation between the contracting parties. This 
reveals an irregularity in the design of incentives in the construction 
industry.
Figure 3:  How the incentive scheme is designed in the construction industry
6.3 The stage for adopting the incentive schemes in projects
The aim is to establish the stage in which the incentive schemes 
are initiated during project implementation. Figure 4 reveals that 
36% of the respondents agreed that the incentive scheme was 
initiated during the bidding stage, whereas 27%, 19% and 18% of the 
respondents agreed that the incentive schemes were introduced 
during the planning stage, the design stage and the construction 
stage, respectively. The analysis shows lack of consistency in the 
design; this implies that there is no informal incentive scheme design.
Ogwueleka & Maritz • Incentive issues
13
Figure 4:  At what stage do you adopt incentive schemes?
6.4 The percentage range of incentive payoff compared to 
project cost
This section aims to ascertain the percentage range of incentive 
payoff when compared to the project cost. Figure 5 reveals that 67% 
of the respondents were involved in incentive payoff of between 6% 
and 10%, whereas 17% and 18% of the respondents had received 
incentive payoff of between 0% and 5%, and between 16% and 
19%, respectively. This shows that the largest incentive payoff in the 
construction industry is between 6% and 10%.
Figure 5:  The percentage range of incentive payoff compared to project cost in 
projects
6.5 Incentive payoff to construction workforce to achieve the 
specified objectives
This section assesses the respondents’ opinions on how incentive payoff 
should be distributed. Figure 6 shows that 38% of the respondents 
agreed that it should be distributed among the workers, whereas 
26%, 24% and 12% of the respondents agreed that it should be given 
to the subcontractors, middle and top management, respectively. 
This reveals that each group desires a share in the incentive payoff.
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Figure 6:  The most appropriate workforce group to benefit from incentive payoff
6.6 Benefits of incentive schemes during project implementation
This section examines the respondents’ perspectives on the impact 
of the use of incentives on projects. Figure 7 reveals that 57% of 
the respondents agreed that incentives can be used to expedite 
the construction work, whereas 36% of the respondents agreed 
that incentives can encourage reduction cost. Only 7% of the 
respondents agreed that incentives can encourage quality and safe 
work, whereas none of the respondents agreed that incentives can 
promote cooperation and appropriate allocation of risks among the 
contracting parties. The general principles of incentives are unknown 
to the project stakeholders.
Figure 7:  The most essential benefits of incentive scheme design in projects
6.7 Participation in incentive projects over the past five years
This section evaluates the level of respondents’ participation in 
incentive projects over the past five years. Figure 8 shows that 62% 
of the respondents did not participate in incentive projects over the 
past five years, while 38% of the respondents did participate. This 
reveals a low level of participation in incentive projects.
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Figure 8: The level of participation in incentive projects over the past five years
6.8 Challenges confronting the effective use of incentive design 
in the construction industry
This section seeks the respondents’ opinions on the challenges 
confronting the use of incentives during project implementation. The 
respondents ranked the parameters using the Likert-scale of 1 to 5 
as described in section 5, the RII for each parameter is calculated, 
and the absolute deviation of the mean, variance and standard 
deviation of the distribution are calculated to measure the scatter 
about the mean. The coefficient of skewness is computed to measure 
the distribution of the extreme value to indicate how it has affected 
the mean. Table 3 reveals the results of the analysis.
Table 3: Incentive issues in the construction industry
Parameters Indices(I) Rank Mean deviation (I-µ)2
Inappropriate procedural justice 
(transparency and fairness in 
decision-making)
3.19 10th -0.30 0.09
Payment problems 3.59 4th 0.10 0.01
Inappropriate risk allocation 3.41 7th -0.08 0.01
Unattainable project goals 3.68 1st 0.19 0.04
Poor reward intensity (compensation for risk 
and effort) 3.47 6th -0.02 0.00
Poor communication processes 3.66 2nd 0.17 0.03
Low level targets (sharing ratio) 3.35 8th -0.14 0.02
Neglect of the subcontractors in the 
incentive design 3.59 4th 0.10 0.01
Lack of integrity among the contracting 
parties 3.28 9th -0.21 0.04
Poor organisational culture 3.53 5th 0.04 0.00
Inappropriate contractual arrangement 3.64 3rd 0.15 0.02
Poor performance appraisal programmes 3.47 6th -0.02 0.00
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The variance and standard deviation are calculated as 0.02 and 
0.15, respectively. Using this formula to determine the coefficient of 
skewness (SK) = 3(mean – median)/ s, the result is -0.2, approximately 
equal to zero. This implies that the data is normally distributed. 
Cronbach’s alpha reliability test is conducted using SPSS to examine 
the internal consistency of the parameters. Alpha values greater than 
0.7 are regarded as sufficient (Pietersen & Maree, 2007: 216). The 
consistency test reveals Cronbach’s alpha of 0.839, it shows a high 
internal consistency, which is considered acceptable in research. 
Table 3 reveals ‘unattainable project goals’ as the highest score, 
followed by ‘poor communication processes’ as the second, and 
‘inappropriate contractual arrangement’ as the third. The range 
of spread between the highest score and the lowest score is 0.40, 
indicating that other parameters are equally significant. Goals are 
proven to be an effective motivation tactic; therefore, they should be 
set sufficiently high to encourage high performance and sufficiently 
low to be attainable (Ogwueleka, 2011: 345). The current reform in 
the South African construction industry is targeted towards increasing 
the skilled workforce, reducing unemployment and poverty. The 
findings reveal unattainable project goals as a challenge in incentive 
design; therefore, there is a need to redesign the existing incentive 
scheme in order to promote goal commitment. According to 
Bennett (2009: online), the goals should be specific, measurable, 
achievable, realistic, and timely so as to not jeopardise motivation 
and commitment, thereby infusing corruption, dishonesty and cutting 
corners. In general, people are inclined to be dishonest if they fall 
short of their goals (Schweitzer, Ordonez & Douma, 2004: 428).
Construction projects are regarded as complex and risky, thus 
requiring the active participation of project stakeholders to achieve 
the specified objectives. Good communication at both intra- and 
inter-organisational levels can improve motivation levels and the 
construction processes. This is in line with the review conducted 
by Williams (2008: online, citing Kevin Dougherty, Florida-based 
consultant); it emphasises that effective communication is ranked as 
one of the top challenges currently facing the construction industry. 
James & Clancy (2009: 31) stipulate that it is difficult to measure the 
ripple costs of poor communication which prove to be a serious 
challenge to the construction industry. It is estimated that in 50% to 
75% of all construction project time extensions, cost overruns and 
contractual claims could have been mitigated or eliminated by 
means of better up-front communication. The proper management 
of construction requires a constant flow of information between all 
the contracting parties. The findings show poor communication as a 
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challenge to dissemination of the incentive design in the construction 
projects. It is essential to address communication in the industry 
in order to improve its future. The third ranked is ‘inappropriate 
contractual arrangement’. The previous findings show that there is 
no formal contractual arrangement for incentive design in the South 
African construction industry. The discrepancy in the arrangements 
may be a contributing factor to ineffective utilisation of incentives in 
the industry.
7. Conclusions
There is evidence that the South African construction industry is a 
crucial sector in the economy with a large number of employers. The 
workforce is dominated by small and micro-firms, with only a few large 
construction firms. The majority of construction works are executed 
by subcontractors, but they are not included in the provisional and 
general fees or so-called ‘incentive plan’. The article reveals that 
the structure of the existing incentive plan does not encourage early 
completion. The interviews conducted during the review process 
indicate that the main contractors are not willing to complete their 
project works prior to the targeted completion date due to the daily 
payment of provisional and general fees. According to Ogwueleka 
(2010: 209), the early completion of project works will not only save 
time, but also cost and other related variables. The findings show that 
cost/financial and schedule/delivery incentives are most frequently 
adopted in the industry; this is in line with the criticism of CIDB (2013: 
online) that only approximately 50% of South Africa’s construction 
tenders are evaluated based on quality. The respondents’ responses 
based on benefits of incentive schemes disclose that the majority of 
stakeholders are unaware of the general principles of incentives and 
that there is a low level of participation in incentive projects.
This article shows that the use of incentives has been advocated 
by many researchers as motivational tools, which can propel 
contractors’ objectives towards clients’ expectations, but it can 
also induce undesired behaviours and restrain the formation of trust 
and cooperation between the contracting parties if not carefully 
designed and implemented. It is, therefore, important to design 
incentives to collaborate and align the entire team’s effort, focusing 
on more efficient ways to deliver the objectives of the team and the 
project (Maritz & Ogwueleka, 2013: 5). The analysis of the challenges 
confronting the effective use of incentive design in the construction 
industry reveals ‘unattainable project goals’, ‘poor communication 
processes’ and ‘inappropriate contractual arrangement’ as the 
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most significant parameters. There is a need to redesign the existing 
incentive plan, with the focus on how to resolve these challenges 
and encourage early completion of project works; this will also be 
beneficial to the government.
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